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Abstract— Cloud computing allows shared computer and 
storage facilities to be used by a multitude of clients. While 
cloud management is centralized, the information resides in 
the cloud and information sharing can be implemented via off-
the-shelf techniques for multiuser databases. Users, however, 
are very diffident for not having full control over their 
sensitive data. Untrusted database-as-a-server techniques are 
neither readily extendable to the cloud environment nor easily 
understandable by non-technical users. To solve this problem, 
we present an approach where agents share reserved data in a 
secure manner by the use of simple grant and revoke 
permissions on shared data. 
Keywords - Information sharing; privacy; distributed data; 
cloud computing; multi-agent systems. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is the commercial evolution of grid 
computing [21]; it provides users with readily available, pay-
as-you-go computing and storage power, allowing them to 
dynamically adapt their IT (Information Technology) costs 
to their needs. In this fashion, users need neither costly 
competence in IT system management or huge investments 
in the start-up phase in preparation for future growth.  
While the cloud computing concept is drawing much 
interest, several obstacles remain to its widespread adoption 
including:  
• Current limits of ICT infrastructure: availability, 
reliability and quality of service; 
• Different paradigm of development of web 
applications with respect to those used for desktop  
applications; 
• Privacy risks for confidential information residing in 
the cloud.  
Hopefully, the first obstacle will diminish over time, 
thanks to the increasingly widespread availability of the 
network; the second will progressively disappear by training 
new developers and retraining the older; the third issue 
however, is far from being solved and may impair very 
seriously the real prospects of cloud computing. 
In this paper, we illustrate some techniques for providing 
data protection and confidentiality in outsourced databases 
(Section II) and then we analyze some possible pitfalls of 
these techniques in Cloud Computing (Section III), which 
bring us to propose a new solution based on multi-agent 
systems (Section IV). 
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY 
The cloud infrastructure can be accessible to public users 
(Public Cloud) or only to those operating within an 
organization (Private Cloud) [1]. Generally speaking, 
external access to shared data held by the cloud goes through 
the usual authentication authorization and communication 
phases. The access control problem is well-known in the 
database literature and available solutions guarantee a high 
degree of confidence.  
However, the requirement that outsourced data cannot be 
accessed or altered by the maintainer of the datastore is not 
met as easily, especially on public clouds like Google App 
Engine for Business, Microsoft Azure Platform or Amazon 
EC2 platform. 
Indeed, existing techniques for managing the outsourcing 
of data on untrusted database servers [11] [12] cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to public clouds, due to several 
reasons:  
• The physical structure of the cloud is, by definition, 
undetectable from the outside: who is really storing 
the data?  
• The user often has no control over data replication, 
i.e., how many copies exist (including backups) and 
how are they managed?  
• The lack of information on the geographical location 
of data (or its variation over time) may lead to 
jurisdiction conflicts when different national laws 
apply. 
In the next section, we will briefly summarize the 
available techniques for data protection on untrusted servers, 
and show how they are affected by the problems outlined 
above. 
A. Data Protection  
To ensure data protection in outsourcing, the literature 
reports three main techniques [4]:  
• Data encryption [13]; 
• Data fragmentation and encryption [14]; 
o non-communicating servers [15][16]; 
o unlinkable fragments [17]; 
• Data fragmentation with owner involvement [18]. 
1) Data encryption  
To prevent unauthorized access by the datastore manager 
(DM) managing the outsourced RDBMS (Relational Data 
Base Management Systems), the data is stored encrypted. 
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Obviously, the encryption keys are not known to the DM and 
they are stored apart from the data. The RDBMS receives an 
encrypted database and it works on meaningless bit-streams 
that only the clients, who hold the decryption keys, can 
interpret correctly.  
Note that decryption keys are generated and distributed 
to trusted clients by the data owner or by a trusted delegate. 
Encryption can occur with different levels of granularity: 
field, record, table, db. For efficiency reasons, normally, the 
level adopted is the record (tuple in relational databases).  
Of course, because the data is encrypted, the DBMS 
cannot index it based on plaintext and therefore it cannot 
resolve all queries. Available proposals tackle this problem 
by providing, for each (encrypted) field to be indexed, an 
additional indexable field, obtained by applying a non-
injective transformation f to plaintext values (e.g., a hashing 
of the field's content). This way, queries can be performed 
easily and with equality constraints, although with a 
precision < 1 (to prevent statistical data mining). The trusted 
client, after receiving the encrypted result set for the query, 
will decrypt and exclude spurious tuples. In this setting, 
however, it is difficult to answer range queries, since f in 
general will not preserve the order relations of the original 
plaintext data.  Specifically, it will be impossible for the 
outsourced RDBMS to answer range queries that cannot be 
reduced to multiple equality conditions (e.g., 1<=x<=3 can 
be translated into x=1 or x=2 or x=3). In literature, there are 
several proposals for f, including:  
1. Domain partitioning [22]: the domain is partitioned 
into equivalence classes, each corresponding to a single 
value in the codomain of f; 
2. Secure hashing [11]: secure one-way hash function, 
which takes as input the clear values of an attribute and 
returns the corresponding index values. f must be 
deterministic and non-injective.  
To handle range queries, a solution, among others, is to 
use an encrypted version of a B ± tree to store plaintext 
values, and maintain the values order. Because the values 
have to be encrypted, the tree is managed at the Client side 
and it is read-only in the Server side. 
2) Data fragmentation  
Normally, of all the outsourced data, only some columns 
and/or some relations are confidential, so it is possible to 
split the outsourced information in two parts, one for 
confidential and one for public data. Its aim is to minimize 
the computational load of encryption/decryption.  
a) Non-communicating servers  
In this technique, two split databases are stored, each in a 
different untrusted server (called, say, S1 and S2). The two 
untrusted servers have to be independent and non-
communicating, so they cannot ally themselves to 
reconstruct the complete information. In such situation, the 
information may be stored in plaintext in each server.  
With this approach, each Client query need be 
decomposed in two subqueries: one for S1 and one for S2. 
The resulting sets have to be related and filtered, later, at 
Client level.  
 
b) Unlinkable fragments  
In reality, it is not easy to ensure that split servers do not 
communicate; therefore the previous technique may be 
inapplicable. A possible remedy is to divide information in 
two or more fragments. Each fragment contains all the fields 
of original information, but some are in clear while the 
others are encrypted. To protect encrypted values from 
frequency attacks, a suitable salt is applied to each 
encryption. Fragments are guaranteed to be unlinkable (i.e., 
it is impossible to reconstruct the original relation and to 
determine the sensitive values and associations without the 
decrypting key). These fragments may be stored in one or 
more servers.  
Each query is then decomposed in two subqueries:  
• The first, on the Server, chooses a fragment (all 
fragments contain the entire information) and selects 
tuples from it according to clear values and returns a 
result set where some fields are encrypted;  
• The second, on Client (only if encrypted fields are 
involved in the query), decrypts the information and 
removes the spurious tuples according to encrypted 
values.  
3) Data fragmentation with owner involvement  
Another adaptation of non-communicating servers 
consists of storing locally the sensitive data and relations, 
while outsourcing the storage of the generic data. So, each 
tuple is split in a server part and in a local part, with the 
primary key in common. The query is then resolved as 
shown above.  
B. Selective access  
In many scenarios, access to data is selective, with 
different users enjoying different views over the data. Access 
can discriminate between read and write of a single record or 
only a part of it.  
An intuitive way to handle this problem is to encrypt 
different portions of data with different keys that are then 
distributed to users according to their access privileges. To 
minimize overhead we want that:  
• No more than one key is released to each user; 
• Each resource is encrypted not more than once.  
To achieve these objectives, we can use a hierarchical 
organization of keys. Basically, users with the same access 
privileges are grouped and each resource is encrypted with 
the key associated with the set of users that can access it. In 
this way, a single key can be possibly used to encrypt more 
than one resource.  
1) Dynamic rights management  
Should the user’s rights change over time (e.g., the user 
changes department) it is necessary to remove that user from 
a group/role as follows:  
• Encrypt data by a new key; 
• Remove the original encrypted data; 
• Send the new key to the rest of the group.  
Note that these operations must be performed by data 
owner because the untrusted DBMS has no access to the 
keys. This active role of the data owner goes somewhat 
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against the reasons for choosing to outsource data in the first 
place. 
a) Temporal key management  
An important issue, common to many access control 
policies, concerns time-dependent constraints of access 
permissions. In many real situations, it is likely that a user 
may be assigned to a certain role or class for only a certain 
period of time. In such case, users need a different key for 
each time period. A time-bound hierarchical key assignment 
scheme is a method to assign time-dependent encryption 
keys and private information to each class in the hierarchy in 
such a way that key derivation also depends on temporal 
constraints. Once a time period expires, users in a class 
should not be able to access any subsequent keys if not 
authorized to do so [7].  
b) Database replica  
In [5], the authors, exploiting the never ending lower 
price-per-byte, propose to replicate n times the source 
database, where n is the number of different roles having 
access to the database. Each database replica is a view, 
entirely encrypted using the key created for the 
corresponding role. Each time that a role is created, the 
corresponding view is generated and encrypted with a new 
key expressly generated for the newly created role. Users do 
not own the real key, but receive a token that allows them to 
address a cipher demand to a set KS of key servers on the 
cloud.  
C. A document base sample: Crypstore  
An example of data protection implementation by data 
encryption is Crypstore. It is a non-transactional architecture 
for the distribution of confidential data. The Storage Server 
contains data in encrypted form, so it cannot read them. User 
who wants to access data is authenticated at the Key Servers 
with the certificate issued by the Data Administrator and 
requires the decryption key. The Key Servers are N and, to 
ensure that none of them knows the whole decryption key, 
each of them contains only a part of the encryption key. To 
rebuild the key, only M (<N) parts of key are needed; 
redundancy provides greater robustness to failures and 
attacks (e.g., Denial of Service attacks).  
In practice, it is an application of the time-honored 
"divide and conquer" technique, where data is separated 
from decryption keys.  
Here the privacy is not entirely guaranteed because, 
theoretically at least, the owner of Key Servers and the 
Storage Server may agree to overcome the limitations of the 
system. The only way to exclude the (remote) possibility is 
to have trusted Key Servers, but if so, it would be useless to 
distinguish the two structures and we could take data 
directly, as plaintext, to a trusted storage. Such criticism 
applies however only in theory because, in practice, the 
probability of such an agreement decreases with the number 
of players involved.  
III. PRIVACY WITHIN THE CLOUD  
All techniques discussed above are based on data 
encryption and/or data fragmentation using full separation of 
roles and of execution environments between the user and 
the datastore (and possibly the keystore) used to manage the 
outsourced data.  
Let us now compare the assumptions behind such 
techniques with two of the basic tenets of current cloud 
computing architectures: data and applications being on the 
“same side of the wall”, and data being managed via 
semantic datastores rather than by a conventional RDBMS.  
A. On the same side of the wall  
Ubiquitous access is a major feature of cloud computing 
architectures. It guarantees that cloud application users will 
be unrestrained by their physical location (with internet 
access) and unrestrained by the physical device they use to 
access the cloud. 
To satisfy the above requirements (in particular the 
second), we normally use thin clients, which run cloud 
applications remotely via a web user interface.  
The three main suppliers of Public Cloud Infrastructure 
(Google App Engine for Business, Amazon Elastic Compute 
Cloud and Windows Azure Platform) all include a datastore, 
and an environment for remote execution summarized in 
Tables I and II:  
TABLE I.  DATASTORE SOLUTIONS USED BY PUBLIC CLOUDS 
Environment Datastore 
Google  Bigtable  
Amazon  IBM DB2  
IBM Informix Dynamic Server  
Microsoft SQLServer Standard 2005  
MySQL Enterprise  
Oracle Database 11g  
Others installed by users 
Microsoft  Microsoft SQL Azure  
TABLE II.  EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS USED BY PUBLIC CLOUDS 
Environment Execution environment 
Google  J2EE (Tomcat + GWT)  
Python  
Amazon  J2EE (IBM WAS, Oracle WebLogic Server) 
and others installed by users 
Microsoft  .Net  
 
In all practical scenarios, public cloud suppliers handle 
both data and application management.  
 
 
Figure 1.  The wall 
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If the cloud supplier is untrustworthy, she can intercept 
communications, modify executable software components 
(e.g., using aspect programming), monitor the user 
application memory, etc. 
Hence, available techniques for safely outsourcing data 
to untrusted DBMS no longer guarantees the confidentiality 
of data outsourced to the cloud.  
The essential point consists in having the data and the 
user interface application logic on the same side of the wall. 
This is a major difference w.r.t. the outsourced database 
scenarios, where presentation was handled by trusted clients. 
In the end, the data must be presented to the user in an 
intelligible and clear form; that is the moment when a 
malicious agent operating in the cloud has more 
opportunities to intercept the data. To prevent unwanted 
access to the data at presentation time, it would be 
appropriate moving the presentation logics off the cloud to a 
trusted environment that may be an intranet or, at the bottom 
level, a personal computer. 
However, separating data (which would stay in the 
cloud) from the presentation logics may enable the creation 
of local copies of data, and lead to an inefficient cooperation 
between the two parts.   
B. Semantic datastore  
Cloud computing solutions largely rely on semantic 
(non-relational) DBMS. These systems do not store data in 
tabular format, but following the natural structure of objects. 
After more than twenty years of experimentation (see, for 
instance, [8] for the Galileo system developed at the 
University of Pisa), today, the lower performance of these 
systems is no longer a problem. In the field of cloud 
computing, there is a particular attention to Google Bigtable.  
"Bigtable is a distributed storage system for managing 
structured data that is designed to scale to a very large size: 
petabytes of data across thousands of commodity servers. In 
many ways, Bigtable resembles a database: it shares many 
implementation strategies with databases." [9] 
With a semantic datastore like Bigtable, there is a more 
strict integration between in-memory data and stored-data; 
they are almost indistinguishable from programmer 
viewpoint. There are not distinct phases when the program 
loads data from disk into main memory or, in the opposite 
direction, when program serialize data on disk. Applications 
do not even know where data is stored, as it is scattered over 
the cloud.  
In such a situation, the data outsourcing techniques 
discussed before cannot be applied directly, because they 
were designed for untrusted RDBMS. 
IV. OUR APPROACH  
We are now ready to discuss our new approach to the 
problem of cloud data privacy. We build over the notion 
introduced in [5] of defining a view for every user 
group/role, but we prevent performance degradation by 
keeping all data views in the user environment.  
 Specifically, we atomize the couple 
application/database, providing a copy per user. Every 
instance runs locally, and maintains only authorized data that 
is replicated and synchronized among all authorized users.  
In the following subsections we will analyze our solution 
in detail.  
A. Information sharing by multi-agent system  
We will consider a system composed of:  
1. Local agents distributed at client side; 
2. A central synchronization point.  
1) The model  
In the following, we will use the term dossier to indicate 
a set of correlated information. Our data model may be 
informally represented by the diagram in Figure 4. 
   
Figure 2.  The model  
In the model, each node represents a local, single-user 
application/database dedicated to an individual user (un). The 
node stores only the dossiers that un owns. Shared dossiers 
(in this example, d1) are replicated on each node. When a 
node modifies a shared dossier, it must synchronize, also 
using heuristics and learning algorithms, with the other 
nodes that hold a copy of it.  Below we give a simple SWOT 
analysis of this idea. 
2) Strength/Opportunities  
• Unrestrained individual nodes, that can also work 
offline (with deferred synchronization);  
• Simplicity of data management (single user);  
• Completeness of local information.  
To understand the last point, suppose that the user un 
wants to know the number of the dossier she is treating. In a 
classic intranet solution, where dossiers would reside on their 
owners' servers, in addition to its database, un should 
examine the data stores of all other collaborating users. With 
our solution, instead, un can simply perform a local query 
because the dossiers are replicated at each client. 
3) Weaknesses/Threats  
• Complexity of deferred synchronization schemes 
[19];  
• Necessity to implement a mechanism for 
grant/revoke and access control permissions. 
This last point is particularly important and it deserves 
further discussion: 
• As each user (except the data owner) may have 
partial access to a dossier, each node contains only 
the allowed portion of the information; 
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• Authorization, i.e., granting to a user uj access to a 
dossier dk, can be achieved by the data owner simply 
by transmitting to the corresponding node only the 
data it is allowed to access; 
• The inverse operation will be made in the case of a 
(partial or complete) revocation of access rights. An 
obvious difficulty lies in ensuring that data, once 
revoked, is no longer available to the revoked node. 
This is indeed a moot point, as it is impossible – 
whatever the approach - to prevent trusted users 
from creating local copies of data while they are 
authorized and use them after revocation. 
B. Proposed solution  
We are now ready to analyze in detail our solution. To 
simplify the discussion, we introduce the following 
assumptions:  
• Each dossier has only one owner; 
• Only the dossier's owner can change it. 
Those assumptions allow the use of an elementary 
cascade synchronization in which the owner will submit the 
changes to the receivers.  
   
Figure 3.  Deployment diagram of multi-agent system  
Our solution consists of two parts: a trusted client agent 
and a remote untrusted synchronizer.  
The client maintains local data storage where:  
• The dossiers whom he owns are (or at least can be) 
stored as plaintext; 
• The others, instead, are encrypted, each with a 
different key.  
The Synchronizer stores the keys to decrypt the shared 
dossiers owned by the local client and the modified dossiers 
to synchronize.  
When another client needs to decrypt a dossier, he must 
connect to the Synchronizer and obtain the corresponding 
decryption key.  
The data and the keys are stored in two separate entities 
and therefore none can access information without the 
collaboration of the other part.  
1) Structure  
From the architectural point of view, we divide our 
components into two packages, a local (client agent), which 
contains the dossier and additional information such as 
access lists, and a remote (global synchronizer), which 
contains the list of dossiers to synchronize, their decryption 
keys and the public keys of clients.  
 
Figure 4.  Class view 
2) Grant  
An owner willing to grant rights on a dossier must follow 
the following sequence:  
 
Figure 5.  Grant sequence 
Namely, for each receiver, the owner:  
• generates the decryption key  
• encrypts it with the public key of the receiver to 
ensure that others cannot read it 
• signs it with its private key to ensure its origin  
• sends it to the Synchronizer, which verifies the 
origin and adds it to the storage of the decoding 
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keys. The key is still encrypted with the public key 
of the receiver, so only the receiver can read it.  
3) Send  
When an owner modifies a dossier, she sends it to the 
Synchronizer following this sequence:  
  
 
Figure 6.  Send sequence 
For each receiver, the owner:  
• generates a "pending dossier" by removing 
information that the receiver should not have access 
to;  
• encrypts it with the public key of the receiver to 
ensure that others cannot read it; 
• signs with his own private key to certificate its 
origin; 
• sends it to the Synchronizer, which verifies the 
origin and adds it to the storage of "pending 
dossiers”. Again, the dossier is still encrypted with 
the public key of the receiver, so only the receiver 
can read it.  
4) Receive  
Periodically, each client updates un-owned dossiers by 
following this sequence:  
  
 
Figure 7.  Receive sequence 
Each client: 
• requests the Synchronizer the "pending dossiers"; 
• modifies the local storage; 
• removes from the Synchronizer the received 
dossiers. 
5) Use  
When a client needs to use an unowned (encrypted) 
dossier, the following sequence is used:  
  
 
Figure 8.  Use sequence 
The client:  
• asks the Synchronizer for the decryption key (that is 
encrypted by his public key); 
• decrypts it with its private key;  
• decrypts the dossier by the resulting decryption key. 
If the decryption key does not exist, two options are 
available:  
• the record is deleted from the local datastore because 
a revoke happened; 
• the record remains cached (encrypted) into the local 
datastore because the access rights could be restored. 
6) Revoke  
To revoke access to a receiver, it is sufficient to delete 
the corresponding decryption key from the Synchronizer:  
 
Figure 9.  Revoke sequence 
7) Implementation  
We are currently implementing the proposed solution 
using an IMDB (in-memory database), such HyperSql 
(www.hsqldb.org). An in-memory database (IMDB also 
known as main memory database system or MMDB) is a 
database management system that primarily relies on main 
memory for computer data storage.  
A HyperSql db consists of a text file containing sql 
instructions to:  
• create structure (tables, indexes, etc.); 
• populate tables. 
At DBMS startup, this file is read and HyperSql creates a 
data model of the db into memory. At closing, the data 
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model is serialized on the disk (actually also intermediate 
writes in a log file occur, to minimize the risk of data loss for 
sudden failure). The implementation of our solution, 
therefore, will consist in rewriting the load and save 
operations. The load function need implement the above-
mentioned sequence.  
8) Future work 
In the next future, we must deepen the synchronization 
algorithm [23], benchmark the performance in a system 
under stress and use a cache of decoding time-bounded keys 
[6] to allow users to work offline.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper, we discussed the applicability of 
outsourced DBMS solutions to the cloud and provided the 
outline of a simple yet complete solution for managing 
confidential data in public clouds.   
We are fully aware that a number of problems remain to 
be solved. A major weakness of any data outsourcing 
scheme is the creation of local copies of data after it has been 
decrypted. If a malicious client decrypts data and then it 
stores the resulting plaintext data in a private location, the 
protection is broken, as the client will be available to access 
its local copy after being revoked. In [20], obfuscated web 
presentation logic is introduced to prevent client from 
harvesting data. This technique, however, exposes plaintext 
data to cloud provider.  The manager of plaintext data is 
always the weak link in the chain and any solution must 
choose whether to trust the client-side or the server-side. 
Another issue concerns the degree of trustworthiness of 
the participants. Indeed, untrusted Synchronizer never holds 
plaintext data; therefore it does not introduce an additional 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) with respect to the solutions 
described at the beginning of the paper. However, we need to 
trust the Synchronizer to execute correctly the protocols 
explained in the paper. This is a determining factor that our 
technique shares with competing solutions and, although an 
interesting topic, it lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
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